India Sport StackThe Long Whistle
THE LONG WHISTLE
FootballLeague economics · 6 min read

ISL — The League That Gave Itself Away

The ISL kicked off today owned by its own clubs, with its live rights free on YouTube.

All figures in US dollars, rupees in brackets · USD 1 = INR 88
Mohun Bagan Super Giant with the ISL Cup. From this season the thirteen clubs own the competition they play in.
Mohun Bagan Super Giant with the ISL Cup. From this season the thirteen clubs own the competition they play in. Indian Super League

On 14 August 2026, Tata Steel's board approved the transfer of its entire holding in Jamshedpur FC's operating company to Churchill Brothers. The consideration, disclosed in a stock-exchange filing, was INR 100. About one US dollar.

The club came with an ISL licence and the contracts of twelve players and two coaches. Its revenue had fallen 41% in a year to USD 3.7 million. Its net worth was negative. Tata Steel built it in 2017 and ran it for nine seasons.

How it was built

In December 2010 the All India Football Federation signed a fifteen-year agreement with Reliance Industries and IMG worth about USD 80 million (INR 700 crore). The vehicle was Football Sports Development Limited: Reliance 65%, Star 35%, chaired by Nita Ambani.

Under the Master Rights Agreement, FSDL paid the AIFF USD 5.7 million (INR 50 crore) a year for the commercial rights to the league and the national team.

The ISL launched in October 2014 with eight franchises. The owners came from cricket and Bollywood: Sachin Tendulkar in Kochi, Sourav Ganguly in Kolkata, John Abraham in Guwahati, Ranbir Kapoor in Mumbai, Salman Khan in Pune.

For its first three seasons it was not a league. FIFA recognised it as a tournament. The I-League remained India's official competition. The AFC's 2019 roadmap set out one league, one cup and full promotion and relegation by 2024-25. The ISL became the sole top tier in 2022-23. Relegation arrived in 2025-26, a year late.

How it came apart

The Master Rights Agreement expired on 8 December 2025, mid-season.

In early 2025 the Supreme Court barred the AIFF from signing new commercial deals, pending a ruling on the federation's constitution. FSDL proposed a holding company with clubs at 60%. The AIFF declined. The AIFF counter-offered all-cash at USD 5.7 million a year rising 5%. FSDL declined.

In June 2025 FSDL told the clubs the season was on hold. In July it said it was "not in a position to proceed".

On 5 August 2025 Bengaluru FC stopped paying its first team. Its statement: "Running and sustaining a football club in India has always been an uphill climb... the lack of clarity on the League's future leaves us with no choice."

In September the Supreme Court ordered an open tender. FSDL waived its right of first negotiation. The tender sought a minimum guarantee of USD 4.3 million (INR 37.5 crore) a year for fifteen years. It closed on 7 November 2025 with zero bids.

On 26 December, City Football Group sold its 65% of Mumbai City FC, citing "the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the future of the Indian Super League".

The sports minister salvaged a shortened 91-match season from February. Attendance totalled 768,450, an average of 8,634. The 2015 peak was 27,111. The lowest crowd of the season was 156 people, at Odisha against Punjab on 16 May. The Kolkata derby that same season drew 62,201.

FanCode won the broadcast rights to that season for USD 980,000 (INR 8.62 crore), beating six other bidders including JioStar. Two seasons earlier the same rights were worth USD 31 million a year. A 97% fall.

What it is now

In March 2026 Genius Sports bid USD 242 million (INR 2,129 crore) over twenty seasons. The clubs objected that the money sat behind a deductible "net revenue" definition. One official said there was "no guaranteed flow of money to clubs." The bid was not taken up.

On 8 July 2026 the AIFF and the clubs signed a club-led model instead. The thirteen clubs hold the commercial rights through a special purpose vehicle. The AIFF keeps regulation and 10% of net profit. Each club pays a participation fee of USD 125,000 (INR 1.1 crore) a season.

So the AIFF has swapped a guaranteed USD 5.7 million a year for about USD 1.6 million in fees, plus a tenth of a profit the league has never made.

The fee has already cost two clubs. Jamshedpur missed the deadline and withdrew. Diamond Harbour FC won promotion through three divisions, then missed its second instalment; its accounts were reportedly frozen. On 2 September the AIFF ruled it would finish bottom by default, score no points and drop back down. Relegated without playing a match. Mohammedan Sporting and Shillong Lajong were both offered the slot. Both refused.

Today

Thirteen clubs, 163 matches, home and away, with the ISL Cup play-offs restored.

YouTube streams all 163 matches live and free, in India and worldwide. SonyLIV carries them behind a paywall. Sony Sports Network has exclusive television. No party has disclosed a value. The official release and Khel Now disagree on whether Sony takes 80 matches or 120.

The title sponsor is back after three seasons. The league is now the MG Indian Super League. No value was announced. Reported figures range from USD 2.5 to 3.4 million (INR 22 to 30 crore) for two seasons. Hero MotoCorp, the last title sponsor, paid USD 6 million (INR 53 crore) a year when it renewed in 2017.

Identifiable central income now: a title sponsor at USD 1.2 to 1.7 million a year, Sportradar at about USD 1.7 million a season, a ball deal, and undisclosed Sony and YouTube terms. Against USD 31 million of media money two seasons ago.

India is 138th in the FIFA world rankings. The national team has missed a third consecutive Asian Cup and lost to Bangladesh for the first time in 22 years.

The question for Indian sport

The clubs have given away their most valuable asset for nothing. The bet is that free reach on YouTube rebuilds sponsorship value later. It might work. It is also the only move available to a league nobody would pay for, and those are not the same thing.

What nags is the Rs 100. Not that Tata Steel wanted out, but that nobody else wanted in at any price above a rupee. An ISL licence, twelve players and nine years of brand-building were worth less than a cup of tea. That is not a soft market. That is a market that has concluded the asset has no value at all.

For twelve years the ISL was a television programme that happened to involve football clubs. From today it is thirteen clubs who own the thing and will find out what it is worth.

If the broadcaster-funded model is finished, is club ownership the answer, or just what is left when nobody bids?

← Back to Issue 02